Lessons from the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone by Parker, Melissa & Allen, Tim
Lessons	from	the	Ebola	Outbreak	in	Sierra	Leone
In	this	article,	Samuel	Boland	and	Gillian	McKay	of	the	London	School	of	Hygiene	and	Tropical	Medicine	express
their	concerns	over	the	blog	post,	What	will	happen	when	there	is	another	epidemic?		Ebola	in	Mathiane,	Sierra
Leone.	This	blog	includes	a	response	from	Professors	Melissa	Parker	and	Tim	Allen.
	
In	February	2018,	a	piece	titled	What	will	happen	when	there	is	another	epidemic?		Ebola	in	Mathiane,	Sierra	Leone
was	posted	on	the	Africa@LSE	and	From	Poverty	to	Power	blogs.
In	the	blogpost,	Professor	Parker	and	Professor	Allen	tell	us	the	tragic	story	of	what	happened	in	the	village	of
Mathiane,	Sierra	Leone	during	West	Africa’s	recent	Ebola	outbreak.	In	that	village	56	people	contracted	Ebola,	38	of
whom	died.
Reflecting	on	what	led	to	this	situation,	the	authors	write	that	“in	the	end,	it	has	been	argued,	it	was	not	the	soldiers,
the	humanitarian	INGOs,	or	the	World	Health	Organisation	that	played	the	most	important	role	in	containing	the
spread	of	the	disease.	Instead,	it	was	the	people	themselves	and	the	public	health	measures	imposed	by	paramount
chiefs	and	their	subordinates…	which	turned	the	situation	around.	As	Paul	Richards,	author	of	the	book,	Ebola:	How
a	people’s	science	helped	end	an	epidemic,	has	put	it:	‘the	paramount	chiefs	played	a	blinder!’	Our	research
confirms	that	was	the	case’”.
Being	part	of	the	international	response	to	the	outbreak	of	Ebola,	we	agree	that	the	changed	practices	and
behaviours	of	Sierra	Leonean	people	were	pivotal	in	stopping	the	transmission	of	Ebola.	However,	we	disagree	with
two	underlying	premises	of	the	blogpost,	namely	1)	that	the	interventions	of	national	and	international	agencies	were
somehow	unhelpful,	secondary,	or	separate	to	community-led	interventions,	and	2)	that	community	leadership	was
consistently	effective.	These	points	draw	on	conversations	with	15	of	our	Sierra	Leonean	colleagues	who	were	also
Ebola	response	workers	(from	a	different	district	to	Mathiane’s),	with	whom	we	discussed	this	blogpost	as	part	of
ongoing	research.	The	story	of	Mathiane	presented	in	the	original	blog	does	not	reflect	their	experiences	of	the
response	or	the	lessons	they	draw	from	it.
In	their	piece,	Professors	Parker	and	Allen	describe	a	dichotomy	between	insider	and	outsiders	in	the	village	of
Mathiane.	The	people	of	Mathiane	are	categorised	as	‘insiders’	at	odds	with	those	‘outside’	their	community,	implying
that	the	Ebola	response	workers	are	‘outsiders’.	This	is	surprising	given	that	the	vast	majority	of	response	workers
were	Sierra	Leoneans,	who	worked	in	their	own	communities	to	stop	the	outbreak.	These	were	often	regular
community	members	(‘insiders’)	acting	as	response	workers.	They	were	recognised	by	the	Sierra	Leonean
government	and	trained	by	the	World	Health	Organisation	and	both	national	and	international	groups	to	safely
respond	to	the	Ebola	outbreak	within	their	own	communities.	They	performed	community	engagement	and	social
mobilisation	activities,	conducted	disease	surveillance,	managed	contact	tracing,	and	buried	the	dead.	These	Sierra
Leoneans	often	did	this	work	without	(or	with	highly	fragmented)	pay,	and	at	great	risk	to	their	own	lives.	The	Ebola	in
Mathiane	blogpost	would	have	benefited	from	the	perspectives	of	some	of	these	response	workers,	as	they	are	as
much	an	integral	part	of	the	community	of	Mathiane	as	those	interviewed	by	Professors	Parker	and	Allen.	These
workers	could	be	well-placed	to	help	inform	our	understanding	of	Mathiane’s	unique	story	and	to	highlight	lessons
from	the	Ebola	response.		The	voices	of	the	villagers	give	us	the	starting	point	for	how	the	outbreak	and	the
response	played	out	in	this	location,	but	we	believe	that	without	the	response	workers	voices,	the	story	of	Mathiane
is	incomplete.
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An	Ebola	response	worker	Credit:	shutterstock
A	key	lesson	from	the	Sierra	Leone	Ebola	response	is	that	every	community	experienced	the	outbreak	in	a	different
way.	The	character	of	a	response	within	a	particular	community	often	depended	on	timing.	Communities	affected
early	in	the	outbreak	did	not	benefit	from	a	well-resourced	response	as	this	was	not	yet	available.	This	often	led	to
households	in	quarantine	going	without	food,	water	and	health	care,	which	itself	led	to	completely	understandable
acts	of	“resistance”	as	people	sought	to	survive	and	maintain	their	livelihoods	during	that	long	21-day	quarantine
period.
However,	there	was	a	vocal	recognition	among	response	workers	that	comprehensive	community	support	and
engagement	were	crucial	–	this	need	was	seen	as	an	urgent	priority	at	daily	coordination	meetings.	Indeed,	it	always
formed	a	central	tenet	of	Ebola	response	planning	and	operations	at	both	the	National	and	District	levels.	Therefore
the	failures	referenced	by	Professors	Parker	and	Allen	in	Mathiane	do	not,	as	implied,	reflect	an	unwillingness	or
disinterest	within	the	Ebola	response	to	engage	transparently	and	effectively	with	communities.	It	is	only	that	despite
such	recognition	and	intent,	Ebola	response	activities	were	often	highly	fragmented	and	stretched	too	thin,	especially
early	in	the	outbreak.	This	was	a	painful	and	distressing	reality,	one	of	which	many	response	workers	were	acutely
aware,	and	worked	overtime	to	mitigate	as	far	as	they	could.	In	fact,	towards	the	end	of	the	outbreak	(when	only	a
handful	of	cases	remained	and	there	were	thousands	of	responders	working	to	end	transmission),	Ebola-affected
communities	were	often	overwhelmed	with	community	engagement	and	support	activities.
We	argue	that	we	must	be	careful	when	drawing	broad	lessons	from	one	village’s	experiences;	with	the	original	blog
speaking	to	a	very	particular	scenario.	The	authors	write	that	Mathiane’s	people	were	taking	care	of	their	own	needs
without	external	support.	South-Eastern	Sierra	Leone,	where	Mathiane	is	located,	was	an	early	region	to	experience
the	outbreak.	It	is	therefore	likely	that	the	community	was	affected	at	the	time	that	external	support	was	fragmented
and	inadequate.	While	responding	by	themselves	in	this	way	may	have	been	necessary	in	this	village	at	this	early
stage	of	the	response,	it	was	also	exceedingly	risky:	Parker	and	Allen	report	that	56	people	got	Ebola	and	38	died.
When	the	response	became	better	resourced,	good	surveillance,	expertly	trained	burial	teams,	and	appropriate
supportive	care	in	treatment	centres	often	limited	a	communities’	Ebola	cases	and	deaths	to	only	a	few.	So,	while	it
might	be	true	that	the	wider	response	failed	Mathiane,	it	does	not	follow	that	external	responses	should	be	limited
and	local	communities	asked	to	take	a	major	role	in	coping	with	epidemics	without	external	support.	Community
participation	and	initiative	should	not	be	seen	as	a	substitute	to	immediate	and	effective	support	by	national
structures	and	the	international	community	in	future	outbreaks.	Professors	Parker	and	Allen	also	note	exceptional
community	leadership	from	Mathiane’s	Chief,	and	the	role	this	played	in	‘saving’	Mathiane.	Our	experience	and
research	tells	us	that	this	is	far	from	a	guarantee	throughout	Sierra	Leone,	where	local	leadership	and	governance
structures	are	highly	variable	in	their	efficacy.
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For	us,	the	story	of	Mathiane	shows	that	it	was	not	less	but	more	and	better	external	support	–	working	together	with
the	community	–	that	could	have	ended	the	village’s	Ebola	outbreak.	Communities	facing	a	new	and	challenging
disease	in	the	UK	would	not	be	expected	to	cope	independently	–	we	would	expect	and	be	provided	with	leadership,
support,	care,	and	resources	by	a	functional	and	well-resourced	public	health	response	system.	If	that	support	was
not	there,	we	would	demand	it.	And	if	someone	with	a	highly	infectious	disease	became	ill	or	died	within	our	home,
putting	us	at	risk	of	exposure,	it	would	be	the	government	and	external	experts	who	would	care	for	the	sick	or	remove
and	bury	a	body.		No	householder	should	be	expected	to	risk	their	own,	and	others’	lives	by	managing	this	alone.	So
why	would	we	expect	anything	different	for	rural	Sierra	Leonean	communities?	This	is	not	to	say	that	doing	so	does
not	present	its	own	challenges.	As	stated	by	the	authors,	“managing	the	final	stages	and	the	passing	of	a	loved	one
is	a	hugely	important	aspect	of	social	life”,	something	deeply	appreciated	by	Ebola	responders	–	hence	as	the
response	progressed,	better	Ebola	care	(including	innovative	video-calling	facilities	to	talk	to	family	at	home)	and
‘safe	and	dignified’	burial	teams	ensured	that	those	who	were	sick	or	who	passed	away	were	provided	with	as	much
support	from	their	families	as	possible	while	still	adhering	to	infection	prevention	and	control	processes.
We	are	aware	that	there	will	be	peer-reviewed	articles	published	from	this	research	which	will	include	further
information	about	Mathiane	that	will	help	contextualise	their	story	and	which	may	answer	our	questions	and	speak	to
our	concerns.	We	also	understand	and	think	it	important	to	note	that	our	experiences	are	mostly	limited	to	northern
Sierra	Leone	–	therefore,	we	do	not	posit	that	what	we	write	here	is	generalisable	country-wide.	Further,	we	readily
concede	that	interventions,	particularly	those	in	the	Global	South,	carry	enormous	political,	social,	and	historical
complexities,	and	that	any	intervention	is	capable	of	causing	harm	unless	(and	sometimes	even	when)	these
overlapping	milieus	are	considered	and	structured	into	responses.
However,	due	to	the	wide	and	practitioner-oriented	audience	of	this	blog’s	forum	and	the	recent	re-emergence	of
Ebola	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo,	we	felt	it	critical	to	raise	our	concerns	as	soon	as	possible:	instead	of
limiting	external	intervention	in	future	outbreaks,	we	should	continue	to	research	and	consider	how	best	to	learn	from
the	experiences	of	communities	like	Mathiane	to	demonstrate	the	need	for	earlier,	better	resourced,	more
coordinated,	and	more	engaged	interventions.	International,	national	and	community	responses	should	not	be	seen
as	separate:	we	believe	that	all	these	levels	have	a	part	to	play	in	an	effective	response,	one	in	which	communities
and	their	leaders	are	true	partners	in	stopping	transmission.	In	such	a	response,	communities	will	be	able	to	take
advantage	of	the	intervention’s	operational	resources	and	technical	expertise,	and	combine	these	with	their	own	lived
experience	to	ensure	that	the	support	they	get	is	appropriate,	acceptable	and	tailored	for	their	unique	situation	and
needs.
The	fact	remains	that	from	2013-2016,	West	Africa	was	facing	a	wide-spread	epidemic	of	a	highly	contagious	and
deadly	disease.	It	was	through	the	work	and	interventions	of	tens	of	thousands	of	response	workers,	from	the	village
through	the	international	level,	that	just	under	30,000	people	became	infected,	a	number	that	could	have	been	so
much	worse.
Samuel	Boland	and	Gillian	McKay	are	PhD	and	DrPH	students,	respectively,	at	the	London	School	of	Hygiene	&
Tropical	Medicine.	Both	individuals	worked	in	Sierra	Leone	during	the	Ebola	response,	and	now	conduct
retrospective	in-country	field	research	on	the	response	and	how	communities	and	systems	worked	within	it	and	how
this	could	be	improved	in	future.
Response	from	Melissa	Parker	and	Tim	Allen
The	observations	of	people	living	in	Mathiane,	Sierra	Leone,	about	their	experiences	of	the	Ebola	epidemic	have
clearly	troubled	Samuel	Boland	and	Gillian	McKay,	both	of	whom	worked	in	the	country	at	the	time.	In	their	blog	they
largely	dismiss	what	Mathiane’s	residents	told	us	as	misleading	or	too	locally	specific	to	be	of	relevance,	and	they
are	disinterested	in	the	fact	that	the	wording	of	our	blog	was	negotiated	in	a	meeting	with	the	whole	village	(a	point
taken	up	by	Duncan	Green).	Boland	and	McKay	also	ascribe	to	us	a	range	of	views	about	‘insiders’	and	‘outsiders’
that	we	have	not	actually	expressed	–	perhaps	the	most	peculiar	being	that	‘local	communities’	should	be	‘asked	to
take	a	major	role	in	coping	with	epidemics	without	external	support’.
Africa at LSE: Lessons from the Ebola Outbreak in Sierra Leone Page 3 of 5
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-08-08
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/08/08/lessons-from-the-ebola-outbreak-in-sierra-leone/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/
Researcher	Tim	Allen	meets	with	the	elders	of	Mathiane	Village
Image	Credit:	Melissa	Parker
One	of	the	key	issues	that	emerged	from	listening	to	people	in	Mathiane	was	a	lack	of	trust	in	those	attempting	to
deliver	government-sanctioned	Ebola	control	and	treatment	measures.	This	not	only	applied	to	formal	health	workers
and	soldiers	imposing	quarantine	measures,	but	it	extended	to	their	own	paramount	chief.	Instead,	they	turned	to
other	social	resources	and	capacities,	drawing	on	secret	society	arrangements,	which	are	widespread	in	the	country.
They	also	listened	to	information	on	the	radio	and	from	relatives	on	the	telephone	(for	example,	from	the	capital	city,
Freetown);	and	they	used	their	historical	experiences	–	notably	of	hiding	during	the	war	in	the	forest,	and	of	treating
diseases	in	the	past	with	rehydration.	The	latter	was	initially	not	done	in	the	formal	Ebola	Treatment	Centres,
because	staff	were	understandably	terrified	of	becoming	infected	themselves.	The	situation	later	changed,	after
Ugandan	medical	personnel	arrived	in	Sierra	Leone	and,	drawing	on	their	experiences	from	the	2000/2001	epidemic
in	Gulu,	demonstrated	how	it	was	possible	to	safely	rehydrate	patients.
Given	the	emphasis	on	quarantine	and	the	separating	of	infected	people	from	their	loved	ones,	it	is	hardly	surprising
that	people	in	Mathiane	were	terrified	that	if	they	reported	cases	to	the	authorities,	their	relatives	would	be	taken
away	to	die	and	their	bodies	not	returned	for	burial.	Such	experiences	were	common	–	at	least	until	the	end	of
November	2014.	In	contrast,	many	of	those	they	treated	themselves	survived	(probably	because	they	were
continuously	rehydrated	from	the	outset),	and	those	that	did	not,	were	buried	with	respect	close	to	the	village.
In	addition	to	the	lack	of	trust	–	and	what	they	experienced	as	abuse,	the	people	in	Mathiane	complained	about
something	else	too.	They	noted	that	suddenly	they	were	a	focus	of	interest,	were	visited	by	various	delegations	who
made	promises	about	the	future,	and	were	briefly	given	access	to	better	facilities	than	they	had	previously
experienced.	Now	everything	has	gone.	They	are	left	to	their	own	devices,	and	wonder	what	will	happen	if	there	is
another	epidemic.
Boland	and	McKay	suggest	our	blogpost	would	have	benefited	from	including	the	perspectives	of	some	of	the	Sierra
Leonean	response	workers	that	were	linked	to	the	national	control	programme.	They	claim	they	are	as	much	an
integral	part	of	the	community	of	Mathiane	as	those	we	interviewed.	Really?	On	what	evidence?
Of	course	we	interviewed	scores	of	such	response	workers,	including	those	who	were	nominally	responsible	for
Mathiane.	Their	relationship	with	the	population	was,	it	would	be	fair	to	say,	distant	or	fraught.	They	were	unaware	of
the	local	treatment	going	on	in	the	area,	and	were	primarily	focused	on	supporting	the	enforcement	of	quarantine	for
known	cases.	Their	personal	loyalties	were	elsewhere.
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For	Boland	and	McKay,	the	story	of	Mathiane	shows	that	there	was	a	need	for	more	and	better	support.	It	is	hard
disagree	that	‘more	and	better’	support	would	have	been	‘better’,	but	this	begs	the	question	of	what	‘more	and	better’
support	entails.	While	there	is	a	paucity	of	evidence,	it	is	known	that	in	Kailahun	district,	the	outbreak	was	declining
before	the	arrival	of	international	responders;	that	the	imposition	of	bye-laws	by	paramount	chiefs	was	influential	in
containing	the	outbreak	in	some	chiefdoms;	and	that,	in	the	beginning,	some	externally	driven	approaches	had	very
mixed	results.	The	latter	has	been	a	focus	of	much	discussion	by	medical	professionals,	with	the	Word	Health
Organisation	and	some	iNGOs	being	much	criticised	at	international	meetings.
In	terms	of	how	the	epidemic	was	contained,	there	is	manifestly	a	need	for	further	research	to	help	us	understand
what	shaped	the	course	of	the	epidemic.	As	things	stand,	Boland	and	McKay’s	assertion	that	it	was	‘through	the	work
and	interventions	of	tens	of	thousands	of	response	workers….	that	just	under	30,000	people	became	infected,	a
number	that	could	have	been	so	much	worse’,	is	open	to	question.	In	retrospect,	it	was	a	tragedy	that	Ugandan
experiences	of	treating	Ebola	were	not	used	earlier,	and	a	lesson	from	Mathiane	–	as	well	as	other	parts	of	Sierra
Leone	–	is	that	trust	is	a	crucial	aspect	of	public	authority	and	cannot	be	readily	replaced	by	pervasive	enforcement
of	behavioural	change,	setting	aside	conceptions	of	moral	probity	and	familial	responsibility.
As	Boland	and	McKay	note,	a	new	epidemic	occurred	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	(DRC)	in	July.	With
respect	to	this	outbreak	they	make	the	point	that:	‘International,	national	and	community	responses	should	not	be
seen	as	separate:	we	believe	that	all	these	levels	have	a	part	to	play	in	an	effective	response,	one	in	which
communities	and	their	leaders	are	true	partners	in	stopping	transmission.’	That	sounds	fine,	and	concedes	that	the
perspectives	of	people	at	the	receiving	end	of	interventions	are	worth	hearing	after	all,	but	it	suggests	a	rather
optimistic	conception	of	how	such	a	process	might	occur.	Whatever	the	rhetoric,	the	reality	is	that	international	and
national	public	health	programmes	have	often	struggled	to	establish	integrated	systems,	and	engagement	with	target
populations	is	commonly	inadequate	–	especially	when	those	populations	are	poor	and	politically	marginal.
Nonetheless,	it	should	be	acknowledged	that	in	DRC,	the	government,	the	WHO	and	supporting	iNGOs	have	acted
with	speed,	and	have	been	able	to	draw	on	previous	experiences	with	Ebola	in	the	country	(there	have	been	nine
previous	Ebola	outbreaks	in	DRC).	Also,	many	of	the	international	staff	deployed	in	DRC	have	had	recent	experience
of	working	in	the	West	Africa	epidemic,	and	have	been	able	to	use	the	newly	developed	vaccine.	The	confidence	of
affected	populations	in	formal	health	care	provision	could	not	be	assumed	(for	example,	immunisation	coverage	is
low	in	Equateur	Province	–	where	the	outbreak	has	occurred).	However,	on	24	July	2018,	the	DRC	outbreak	was
declared	by	the	WHO	to	have	ended.	A	total	of	54	reported	cases	and	33	deaths	were	reported.	If	the	data	are
accurate,	it	has	been	a	remarkable	achievement	compared	to	the	28,616	cases	and	11,310	deaths	officially	reported
in	West	Africa	between	2013	and	2016.
However,	almost	immediately	afterwards	a	new	outbreak	has	been	reported	in	another	part	of	DRC,	over	1,500	miles
away,	in	a	region	affected	by	widespread	armed	conflict.	Fears	are	currently	being	expressed	about	refugees
spreading	infection	to	neighbouring	countries,	including	Uganda	–	from	where	we	are	writing	this	blog.	Surveillance
will	clearly	be	crucial	for	containment,	but	there	is	no	sign	of	it	so	far.
Update	6	August	2018
Today,	we	have	been	alerted	that	surveillance	is	now	being	introduced	in	Uganda	at	airports	and	border	crossings,
and	we	have	received	a	report	that	a	Ugandan	task	force	has	been	dispatched	to	affected	districts	of	DRC.	The
Ugandan	National	Task	Force	for	Ebola	has	been	activated.	So	it	seems	that	the	government	is	acting	quickly,	and
the	country’s	experience	in	containing	the	serious	outbreak	in	northern	Uganda	in	2000,	as	well	as	assisting	in
treating	patients	in	Sierra	Leone	in	2014/15,	is	being	drawn	upon.
Melissa	Parker	is	Professor	of	Medical	Anthropology	at	the	London	School	of	Hygiene	and	Tropical	Medicine.
Tim	Allen	is	Professor	of	Development	Anthropology	at	LSE	and	Director	of	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa.
	
The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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